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1 2	UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK	
3	UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,	New York, N.Y.
4	V .	13 Cr. 58(KBF)
5	ANTHONY SERRANO,	
6	Defendant.	
7	x	
8		January 9, 2015
9		3:05 p.m.
LO	Before:	
1	HON. KATHERINE B. FORREST,	
L2		District Judge
L3		
L 4	APPEARANCES	
L5	PREET BHARARA United States Attorney for the Southern District of New York BY: RAHUL MUKHI Assistant United States Attorney	
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9	CESAR DE CASTRO VALERIE GOTLIB Attorney for Defendant	
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(Case called)

MR. MUKHI: Good afternoon. Rahul Mukhi for the United States.

THE COURT: Good afternoon, Mr. Mukhi.

MR. DeCASTRO: Cesar DeCastro and Valerie Gotlib for Mr. Serrano, who is seated to my left.

THE COURT: Good afternoon, everyone; and good afternoon, Mr. Serrano, in particular.

We are here today for the sentencing of Mr. Serrano.

Let me start by setting forth for the record the materials that

I received in connection with this proceeding. And you folks

should let me know if you think there is something that I ought

to have that I don't recite, because these are the pieces of

paper that I have now got.

I have received a defense submission dated December 26, 2014, and there is correspondence attached to that, including correspondence relating to some back-and-forth about what the appropriate drug quantities are for inclusion.

There is a letter from Mr. Serrano's wife; from his nephews; from his mother-in-law; from friends; from his wife's friends, who are I understand friends of his as well; from neighbors.

There are, in addition, some pay stubs over various points of time related to construction work that Mr. Serrano had been involved with and had been paid for.

And there were also photographs of Mr. Serrano with his son.

The court has also received a government submission dated January 2, 2015, as well as a letter of today's date, dated January 9, 2015.

Mr. DeCastro and Ms. Gotlib, have you had an opportunity to see this January 9 letter?

MR. DeCASTRO: Yes.

THE COURT: Because it is dated today's date, you have been out and about, you may not have had a chance to see it. I want to make sure you had.

MR. DeCASTRO: The government made sure he e-mailed me this morning and he mailed me copy as well.

THE COURT: Thank you.

The court has also received a copy of a presentence investigation report, which known by the acronym PSR. That is dated September 19, 2014.

Now, the PSR will be filed under seal and made part of the record in this matter. If an appeal is taken, counsel on any appeal can have access to the PSR without any need for further application to the court.

The PSR notes an offense level of 36 and a criminal history category of IV. I would note that the PSR has an error where it refers to the mandatory minimum of ten years. There is no mandatory minimum of ten years. The Alleyne case, and

other cases, indicate that while a court can take into consideration quantities for drugs in excess of that found by the jury, to increase a mandatory minimum does require a finding beyond a reasonable doubt by a jury.

So therefore, and we will talk more about this, the court does not believe that there is a mandatory minimum of ten years associated with the narcotics offense of which

Mr. Serrano had been convicted; but, instead, that there is a five-year minimum relating to the two kilos of cocaine and there is also a minimum relating to the gun charge separately and consecutive required by statute of seven years that is accurately noted by probation.

Does anybody disagree with the court's statement regarding the error in the PSR with respect to the mandatory minimum?

MR. MUKHI: No, your Honor. We completely agree. I also just wanted to note we received on September 22 a corrected page 31 to the PSR, so I just wanted to make sure that was in the record as well.

THE COURT: I don't have that. Is that the only change?

MR. MUKHI: Yes.

THE COURT: Let me take a look at that, if you could; and, Mr. DeCastro, have you received that?

MR. DeCASTRO: I didn't think so. I brought

everything that I thought I have. But it may that be that just slipped by. I will just confer with the government.

THE COURT: My deputy is telling me that he does not believe that we received this. The date is September 22. Let me just take a look and see whether or not it changes anything. By the way, this still does have the mandatory minimum for Count One as noted. That is how the offense was charged, but not how the jury found it in terms of the conviction.

Let me just take a look at the changed language.

MR. MUKHI: Your Honor, this was a correction that we had highlighted from probation. The original page 31, the one that was the September 19 report, there was a discrepancy in the recommendation on page 31 and the recommended sentence on page 29. So originally page 29 said recommended sentence of 346 months and page 31 said, We respectfully recommend that your Honor impose a total sentence of 284 months.

THE COURT: It is interesting because the version I have in September 19 also has the 346. So it may be that the cover note to you is September 22 but, in fact, it is the September 19 PSR.

In any event, is that the only change you are aware of?

MR. MUKHI: Yes.

THE COURT: What we will do, Mr. de Castro, you have got the September 19 PSR?

MR. DeCASTRO: Yes.

THE COURT: We will use the September 19 PSR because that's the one which we have reviewed and which Mr. de Castro has reviewed with their client.

Have you reviewed that with your client?

MR. DeCASTRO: I have, Judge.

THE COURT: And you have noted the comment by Mr. Mukhi. Is that comment already incorporated in your version as it is in mine?

MR. DeCASTRO: Yes.

THE COURT: All right. Do you have any objections, Mr. de Castro, you or your client, to the PSR?

MR. DeCASTRO: The only objections I have are noted in my sentencing submission, which I assume we will discuss a little, which is just holding Mr. Serrano responsible for the additional narcotics, as you already noted, other than the two kilos of cocaine. But in terms of the factual recitation, no.

THE COURT: All right. Let me see how these are worded. I believe the way it is worded, apart from describing the events, is that the government has conveyed to probation that they believe, in paragraph 62 of the PSR, that Mr. Serrano is responsible for 22 kilograms of heroin and two of cocaine. I do believe that that is an accurate reflection of the government's position.

MR. MUKHI: That's correct.

THE COURT: We can add a sentence, which would be fine, which is, Mr. Serrano, defendant, has taken the position that he should not be responsible for the 22 kilos of heroin. I am going to tell you where I am going to come out for sentencing purposes, which is that I am going to, by a preponderance of the evidence, find that Mr. Serrano is responsible for 22 kilos of heroin. That is a different determination than the jury has to reach by a beyond a reasonable doubt standard. My standard is a preponderance of the evidence under the case law. But if you want to have me make that change, I am happy to make it to preserve your position.

MR. DeCASTRO: I don't think it is necessary to make the change to the PSR. I have made that clear, I think, in my submission.

THE COURT: Yes. You have got it in spades in your submissions.

MR. DeCASTRO: So I don't think you need to make that change.

THE COURT: All right. If there are no further factual disputes -- Mr. Mukhi, do you have any other factual disputes as opposed to the arguments?

MR. MUKHI: No. I think I interrupted your Honor before your Honor confirmed with Mr. de Castro that he agrees that the applicable mandatory minimum for Count One is five

years as opposed to ten years.

THE COURT: I think he said yes, but go ahead. Do you agree?

MR. DeCASTRO: I do agree.

THE COURT: So the record is absolutely clear in one place, the court does believe that there are two applicable mandatory minimums here. One relates to the narcotics charge and now conviction, which is 60 months. That is mandatory. That's a mandatory starting point for the court. I have no discretion to go below that.

In addition, there is a mandatory additional consecutive, by statute, seven years, which is added to that, so that adds 84 months, for a total mandatory starting point of 144 months. So the court has no discretion to go below 144 months.

The question is, are we at 144 months or higher than 144 months? That's where the guidelines come in and also the 3553(a) factors.

Is there any dispute about that as a starting point?

MR. MUKHI: No, your Honor.

MR. DeCASTRO: No, Judge.

THE COURT: Thank you.

Then what I would like to do next, before we get to statements, is I will tell you, because I think it is relevant to how you address the 3553(a) factors, the court's

determination of the amount of heroin. As I have described, this has nothing to do with the mandatory minimum. The court is required to come up with the correct guidelines calculation. I am required to do that. That requires me to come up with what, as a matter of law and fact, the court determines is the right amount of drug quantity. Ultimately that goes in this situation to the guidelines calculation, which is advisory. It does not change the mandatory minimums because those are things the jury has to find.

With that said, I do find by a preponderance of the evidence, based upon the court's understanding and view of the evidence as I heard it come in at trial — as you folks know, so the record is clear, I was the presiding judge at the trial, so I saw the evidence in realtime — I do believe that there is sufficient evidence to tie this defendant to the January 9 robbery.

The reasons for that have to do with not only the testimony of Moral, but also the court is significantly persuaded by the telephone calls between the defendant and Camacho and also, in particular, the timing of certain calls right as the incident was occurring and supposed to have ended but in fact the Camachos and others had been arrested.

I acknowledge, and it doesn't affect the court's analysis, of course, that Mr. Serrano was not physically himself present where the cars where approaching the January 9

robbery site, but that doesn't, of course, change the legal responsibility in connection with a conspiracy charge such as that which we have here.

In addition, there is the Webster Avenue burglary, where there were two kilos of heroin stolen and a kilo given to Mr. Serrano, and there is additionally the heroin sold out of the Serrano residence, all of which the court finds by a preponderance of the evidence in fact occurred and are therefore amounts attributable to the defendant.

I do, however, decline to include a leadership enhancement in the guidelines calculation. That leadership enhancement, in terms of the two criteria, would either need to be a leadership role in one of the crimes of conviction or otherwise extensive. Well, leadership role is that it had five or more participants and be otherwise extensive. So it's leadership and either one of five or extensive.

Here I believe that that enhancement would really be most appropriately added to the January 9 robbery. In fact, I think this is a complicated set of circumstances here. I have no doubt that Mr. Serrano was involved in a whole series of robberies with a variety of different people, some of whom at various points in time he deployed and was the leader of and some of whom may have included him in things in one manner or another, but he may not have led in particular various operations.

I think the Camachos were the biggest leaders of the January 9 robbery. I think it is well and truly possible that Mr. Serrano was a leader of that robbery. I have no doubt that Mr. Serrano was, generally speaking, a leader, not under the guidelines, but in terms of the way the facts are of all kinds of robberies and illegal activities generally. But given the facts and circumstances here, I am going to decline to impose the two-point leadership enhancement.

That means that the guidelines calculation that probation has arrived at, which is 36, would be accurate. It would not be 38. It would be 36. The criminal history category would appropriately be IV. That is true, by the way, whether or not two points are added to the criminal history category or the fact that Mr. Serrano was under a probationary term for the 2012 sentence or not when he admitted the instant offense. And I say that because it doesn't matter. He would have been at seven points before or nine points. Either way he is going to fall into criminal history category IV.

So the court does believe and makes its factual findings by a preponderance of the evidence that the appropriate guidelines calculation is 36 and the criminal history category is IV.

MR. MUKHI: Your Honor, I believe, without leadership, the offense level would be 34, not 36, due to the recent amendments on November 1, 2014.

THE COURT: All right. Let me just take a look, actually, and make sure I have confirmed that, but there have been amendments by the 2014 guidelines manual which Mr. Mukhi is suggesting would decrease this by two levels and that may well be true. So let me just double check that. I want to trust but verify for a moment.

Mr. de Castro, do you have a view on that?

MR. DeCASTRO: That was the only thing I was going to mention was the FSA reduction of two points.

THE COURT: Mr. Mukhi is correct that, with the changes that were put in place in November, and therefore because the guidelines in effect as of the date of sentencing are the guidelines which control the court's sentencing proceeding, there is a two-level reduction. Nonetheless, that doesn't cause me to include a leadership enhancement that I wouldn't have included anyway.

 $\hbox{ So the appropriately calculated offense level is 34 } \\$ and $\ensuremath{\mathrm{IV}}.$

Are we all in agreement?

MR. MUKHI: Yes, your Honor.

MR. DeCASTRO: Yes.

THE COURT: All right. From there, what I would like to do is to turn to you folks and have Mr. Mukhi, if the government would like to address the court before sentence is imposed, Mr. de Castro and Mr. Serrano.

MR. MUKHI: Yes, your Honor.

Just first, with respect to your Honor's finding as to the defendant's responsibility for January 9, I take it your Honor's finding includes his responsibility under both 1B1.3(1)(a), as part of his direct acts and commissions, as well as because he was involved in jointly undertaking criminal activity, that this was reasonably foreseeable to him; given the scope of the activity and the fact of the phone records and other testimony here heard at trial, that the January 9 attempted robbery was specifically foreseeable to this defendant.

THE COURT: Yes. I think that there is probably a couple of different ways we can arrive at the court's determination as to the appropriate drug quantity.

The defendant was convicted of narcotics conspiracy, and I find by a preponderance of the evidence that that conspiracy included the conduct involved in the January 9, 2013, event and that all of the acts that were committed, that he participated in the acts that were committed on that date and that also what occurred on that date was certainly reasonably foreseeable to him. I have no doubt, based upon a preponderance of the evidence, he was involved in the planning of that offense, knew what was happening, and was intimately involved, though not present.

MR. MUKHI: Thank you, your Honor.

THE COURT: All right.

MR. MUKHI: We will be brief because we put in an extensive submission and your Honor is familiar with the facts. But the two things I wanted to highlight:

One, with respect to the October 14 robbery, there were real victims to that robbery and they testified here.

Your Honor saw the effect that the robbery had on Mr. Gilbert, who was the target of the robbery, the drug dealer, and his girlfriend, Ms. Ynfante, who was a completely innocent victim. Both of them testified about how traumatized they were by being held up at gunpoint by Javion Camacho and being boxed in on the streets in Washington Heights by this defendant.

Mr. Gilbert specifically testified about how what he was thinking about in that moment when he was being robbed was that his kids could have been with him. They had just dropped off their kids. There were car seats for kids in the back that they had just been in and that was what he was left with when this defendant and others robbed him and drove off in his car where his kids had been moments earlier.

So I think that is something we wanted to highlight as important, because this was part of the plan. It wasn't accidental that there were victims in that car. The defendant knew that there were going to be victims. Anything really could have happened that night. It was on the streets of Washington Heights. The crew thought that they were robbing

drugs and a drug dealer. The crew was armed, and I imagine that the crew had every belief that the victim could be armed. Luckily there was no gun fight on that street that night, but there very well might have been, and I think it just highlights the defendant's actions of putting the safety of others and the community beneath his own criminal designs and his desires to make money and sell drugs, no matter what the risk is to others and what the cost is to others. So I wanted to emphasize that.

And then the second point I just wanted to emphasize is the recording in July of 2013, so as a 3553(a) factor, the vast majority of this crew, as your Honor is aware, was taken out on January 9. The defendant was not, though he certainly was aware that his crew was arrested that night, and you would think that that would cause him to stop committing crimes, just if not a moral wake up call, but a cost/benefit analysis. At that point, crew members that he did robberies with had been arrested, so you would think it would enter his mind that he would not want to commit any additional crimes, so that he would not also be arrested.

But, instead, in July, he is captured on tape selling a gun, which the government didn't introduce at trial, but the fact of the matter is he did do that; and planning an additional burglary, the watch burglary, that we described in our memorandum, of an individual who was going to be at mosque, and Mr. Serrano was planning to burglarize this person. It's

actually one of the reasons why he was arrested when he was.

Because law enforcement became aware, through that recording,

that he was about to commit a burglary.

So I think what it comments on is the fact that the criminal mind-set has become so ingrained in this defendant that he couldn't even stop once the majority of his crew was arrested and the DEA and the government was aware of the crew.

He has lived many years of his life committing crimes that he has been convicted for. We went through the litany of robberies he was involved in as part of this crew -- July 4, 2012; October 14; the money van job; and January 9 -- and you add that to his history, you add that to the fact that he didn't stop even after January 9.

I think a guidelines sentence here is an absolute necessity to make sure, one, the community is protected for a sufficient period; and, two, that the defendant really is deterred from committing any additional crimes in the future, whatever they are.

Thank you.

THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Mukhi.

Mr. de Castro.

MR. DeCASTRO: Thank you, Judge. I will also be relatively brief. I know the court has reviewed our submission as well as the government's submissions. I am not going to stand here and repeat everything that is in the submission.

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Obviously Mr. Serrano sits here today convicted after trial and he still maintains his innocence for the offense.

And this usually is the case. I know the government does focus mostly on the nature and circumstances of the offense.

The only thing, as I have noted in our submission that I focus on is the nature and circumstances of the offense for which he was convicted. It's obviously our position, as we have made clear in our posttrial motions and in our sentencing submission, is that I think while the court can and has taken into consideration by a preponderance of the evidence the additional robberies, if you will, our position is that it still figures, while the court can do the guidelines analysis, that the jury's verdict should figure somehow into this, into the analysis as to his sentence. Because without it means we are going to ignore the jury verdict completely. And I think it is important that they rejected both of those heroin special conditions. I think it is an important fact. It is an interesting fact from the trial in trying to figure out what that exactly means, but our position is it means that they did not accept that he was part of what was the majority of the government's presentation at trial. The majority of evidence was as to that January 9 robbery, and I think that his knowledge even, not that that was proven, nor do we maintain that he even knew that the January 9 robbery was going to occur, that's not sufficient, and I figure that should figure

somehow in the analysis.

Obviously our position is that it should mean a downward adjustment for similarly situated defendants. Hard to say, since most the defendants that this court has sentenced were picked up on that day. They were arrested on that January 9 sting operation.

And the government has just focused a little bit, and I am not sure if they are trying to distinguish Mr. Serrano from others when say there were real victims. My understanding is everyone was convicted of the same robbery conspiracy, which included the October 14, 2012, robbery where there were real victims. But I don't think that distinguishes Mr. Serrano from any of the other defendants that the court has sentenced here.

The other thing I would focus on, Judge, is just that while he does have a criminal history and certainly the government has made a presentation of what is a defendant conspiring to commit additional crimes, I don't think the court can ignore either that he does have support in his community and he does have in the letters that we have submitted — and in fact we discussed this at a bail application before trial, the things that he has done in his Jersey city community, I think they are real. I think they matter. I think they speak a little bit to the Anthony Serrano of today.

He is 40 years old today. Not today. It is not his birthday. But he is 40 years old and many of his prior

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criminal acts were when he was a younger person. I think he is gaining perspective and, at the same time, Judge, I don't think a sentence that is recommended, the advisory quidelines sentence or any as recommended by the government and probation, takes into account that he hasn't done that much time before. You look at his criminal history, he has done some time in prison, but we are talking about -- it is almost -- the numbers are so high right now that we are throwing around ten years like they are nothing. And I am not suggesting the court is doing that, I am just saying that when we talk, I think, as lawyers going back and forth, one thing that I have learned in my practice is when I try to just explain to family what we are talking about, the common denominator is, wow, you are just talking about so much time as if it is nothing, and I think it is because we practice in this courthouse where the exposure is so high.

I would also just highlight, I am not going to go in length about this, I don't think he should be -- I know the court must take into consideration that he went to trial.

There is no doubt. He went to trial and we learned additional facts we probably would not have learned prior to this trial or prior to the pretrial motions. So certainly the court should and will take those things into consideration.

But the question I think also is how much of a penalty should he receive? He certainly doesn't get three points for

acceptance of responsibility for guidelines. I understand that. What is that value that enhances his sentence for trial what people sometimes colloquially the trial penalty?

I would ask the court sentence him, as I have in my sentencing submission, to 144 months. I think it is more than enough to deter him. It is certainly a lot more time than he has ever done. He is going to be, if you gave 12 years, he will be in his fifties when he is released. I think that's significant.

If the court has no other questions, I will rely on our submission.

THE COURT: Thank you. I have no additional questions right now.

MR. DeCASTRO: Thank you.

THE COURT: Mr. Serrano, is there anything you would like to say to the court before sentence is imposed?

THE DEFENDANT: No.

THE COURT: All right. I just want to make sure the court reporter got the "no." Thank you, sir.

Let me tell you, Mr. Serrano, how I reached a sentencing determination for you. Because I understand that what we are talking about right now very clearly, with all these lawyers talking in the room, is about you, is about your life, about your family, and the impact on your family, and the time that you are going to do, right? Nobody in this room is

going to do this time other than you, and I want you to know that I understand that and that the sentencing determination that I reach isn't a number pulled out of the air, something that I woke up this morning and just thought sounded right or was the number du jour. It is arrived at in a very careful way.

The first thing I have to do is I have to look at the sentencing guidelines. I have to look at what that number ends up being and how it is calculated and make sure I agree with the calculation. You have heard us come up with the calculation, which is 34 and IV. I am required to refer to this big book I have got in my hand and see what a 34/IV is, and that is 210 to 262 months for the guidelines. But then we also have Count Three, which has got the 84 months consecutive to that. So I have to acknowledge that, and I do. I am required to.

I am not bound by the guidelines. They are advisory. I have to always determine whether or not the guidelines sentence is reasonable. Sometimes it is reasonable. Sometimes there is a point in the guidelines range that's more reasonable than another point, and I have got to find out which point within a big range is reasonable. Sometimes it is more reasonable to be higher than the guidelines range and below the statutory maximum. Sometimes it is more reasonable to be lower. So I acknowledge the guidelines range and what that is.

Ultimately, though, my sentencing determination comes from my evaluation of various factors that are set out in the statute. This is called 3553(a). That's just a number where you find it in the book. And that statute requires that a sentencing judge, like myself, determine what is a sufficient but not greater than necessary sentence for a particular defendant for the crimes of conviction. So I don't just go and say — ignoring who you are or what your history is, the good, the bad — here is a number for that kind of crime. I have to think about what it is I understand you have done, what I know about who you are, and arrive at what is a sufficient but not greater than necessary sentence.

I am supposed to ask as part of that what were the nature and circumstances of the various offenses? What do I know about how you committed the crimes? What did the crimes entail? Facts and circumstances of the crime.

I also have to ask, and this is in the statute, what is your history? What are your characteristics? And we will talk about that more. But we know that you have a whole series of arrests. We know you had gun arrests before. We know you have had robbery arrests and convictions before.

We know you have a son. We know you are very dedicated to your son. We know you have a wife and a family. We know you have friends.

It is never one dimension. And I have to take the

history and characteristics of the defendant into consideration when I am trying to come up with a sentencing determination.

Because certain defendants, based upon a whole series of factors, seem like you have got to take them off the street, right? They have got to be incapacitated forever. You never think they are going to be able to turn it around. There are other defendants where you do think they are going to be able to turn it around, and the question is, what is that point? That's personal deterrence.

I also have to look at general deterrence. What, as a society, do we say is an appropriate sentence for people doing similar crimes? Because we don't want to send the wrong message, too high or too low, because that's going to send people off in different directions. Some people, if sentences are really, really low, are going to say, What's the penalty? It's worth it. I will do my time. And other people will say, That guy got a lot of time. I'm not doing that. It's just not worth it to me. I have got to evaluate that. It is one of the factors that I am required to evaluate.

I also have to look at something that's not so relevant for you, is there any medical, educational, vocational, or correctional treatment required by a particular sentence.

So I take all of these and I put them together and I try to come up with what is the right, sufficient, but not

greater than necessary sentence for you.

You, like some defendants, have minimums. That means that Congress has taken away the discretion of the judge about a certain minimum sentence. And that, for you, as your counsel has noted, is the 144 months. It is the 60 months for the drugs, it is the plus seven years for the gun. The robbery doesn't actually have a minimum associated with it, so it is 144 months for the minimum. So I can't go below 144 months.

How do I evaluate all these factors for you? What I do is I start with the nature and the circumstances of the offense and I think to myself, How serious was this offense? What's just punishment? What's the right punishment for this kind of offense and what are we talking about?

Well, we are talking about a number of robberies. I am convinced that you are a career robber. Do I think that's your only skill in life? I don't think that's your only skill in life. I actually think you have got other skills in life as well. I also think that you are capable of being a good guy to your family as well. These things are not inconsistent. You can be a good father and still have a sideline of all kinds of theft and robberies. It is one of the things you know how to do, and I think it is one of the things you have done over and over again. And it is not something I expect you to agree with. You have got an appeal ongoing. And it is consistent, frankly, with your history, the history of being convicted of

other crimes, similar crimes with guns, with half a million dollars almost cargo thefts in the past for which you have served time and for a whole series of things.

So I think with these robberies that are here, in terms of the convictions, as opposed to just general characteristics — the Webster Avenue, the October 14, the money van, the January 9 — they share some common characteristics, which is that you know what you are doing. And you are not stupid. And, frankly, you have become more sophisticated over time and you ran a crew. There were other people. I am not saying you are the only person who could call up the crew and get them to come and report, but you had a crew. And these people and you, what you did was you robbed drug dealers. And on certain occasions you were armed. These were planned, and they were potentially violent. Luckily there is no indication that anybody was physically hurt in these. And I believe it demonstrates that it was what you did. That's what I believe based upon the evidence.

Now you have to understand what I know about you is from the trial. What I know about you is from what people have said at the trial, my evaluation of the evidence at trial.

That's what I have here.

I also believe that there were times that the Camacho brothers worked for you. I don't know if that was always or only sometimes. I don't know the extent to which that was a

fluid relationship.

But that is what we have got in terms of some of the crimes of conviction. There are other aspects to them, as well, in terms of sometimes the utilization of police gear and things of that nature, the use of the fake police car in the October 14 robbery, etc.

I turn, then, from the fact that you had the very serious offense of conviction, also the drug dealing, dealing firearms out of your house, drugs out of your house, heroin out of your apartment. These are things which I credit the testimony at trial.

I turn, then, to the nature and the characteristics, and I ask, So that is the crime, what do I have here in terms of who is the person who is before me? Because not everybody is treated the same way for the same crimes. And what I have is a not uncomplicated person. Let me put it differently. I think I have a complicated person.

You had a tough life growing up. I think that what you have done with your son is admirable. It is very hard, actually, when you are not parented in a way that you were — when you were parented in the way that you were parented, which wasn't the kind of parenting you are giving your son, it is very hard to give your son that kind of parenting. And so that's admirable. That's a characteristic that you have.

But I also believe that there are these other aspects

that are quite troublesome, and they are things like the selling of the heroin out of your home, the selling of the gun out of your home, the fact that you had numerous arrests, numerous chances before, and that you were doing these crimes when your son had already been born. So when you were taking these risks, they were risks you were taking when he was already on the scene. You are not here being convicted of crimes that you committed before he was born. They are crimes you committed after he was born. So to a certain extent you understood the risk you were running when you did that.

So that's also part of the mix. Again, that makes it complicated, because I don't think that you wanted to be away from your son. I think that somehow you thought that you weren't going to get caught. I think you wanted to be with your son. I think you would want to be with your son today. All of that is in the mix.

I also think and am troubled, frankly, by the ridiculous series of noise complaints and noise arrests, and let me tell you why. They are ridiculous. There are a whole bunch of them. The reason they are so ridiculous is it is consistent with the behavior of somebody who is sitting in a car saying, Screw you, society, I'm going to blast my music however I want, and getting arrested again and again for something that is ridiculous. And not just getting arrested once, getting arrested, I have forgotten, it is like 11 times.

Maybe the cops in Jersey just had it out for you. I don't know. But these noise complaints are consistent with a person who is defiant, defiant in a way that is, I can do this. I am better than the law. And it is the only time, I have to say, that I have ever seen anybody with that kind of series of that ridiculous, pure defiance of civilized behavior.

So do I think you would do it again? I think you would do it again. I think if I let you out tomorrow, you would find a way to do it again. I don't think you have come remotely clean in terms of your behavior. I think that one day you might. You have had a lot of chances so far, but you haven't taken advantage of them.

So here we are and what do we do with all of this? I also acknowledge that you have got this young son. I know that. I know that he needs you. Of course he needs you. And your family would like to have you there. I'm not unclear about that at all. I am quite clear about that.

But the reality is that I need to also take into consideration with those facts what you have done, and it is my assessment, based upon all of the factors of 3553(a), that a sentence of 264 months is appropriate. That's a downward variance. It is, in fact, a substantial downward variance.

The reason why I am substantially varying downward is because I actually think that when you are in your fifties, you are likely to have done enough time, have wanted to change your

ways, and want to be with your son in a way he can look at you and be proud of you and not feel like you are going to be going back to jail when you are an old man.

And this breaks down in the following way:

In the court's view, 15 years is appropriate essentially for the burglary and the drug crimes, and that's 180 months. Then consecutive to that is the 84 months for the gun crime. That totals 264 months.

I note that Javion Camacho got 250, so it is slightly more than what he got.

I have taken into consideration your counsel's arguments about penalty for trial. I am not penalizing you for going to trial. You have got a right to go to trial. You have got a constitutional right to go to trial, and I acknowledge that. I think your counsel is absolutely right to raise whether or not that ends up occurring sometimes. It hasn't occurred here. I am not penalizing you for that. I am penalizing you for what I think are all of the factors under 3553(a).

I need to go through each of the counts and tell you how it breaks down.

Count One, which is carries the minimum of five years, the court is imposing the 15 years, 180 months. Count Two is also 180 months. They are to run concurrent, so at the same time. So that's the 180 months I was talking about.

Count Three is, by statute, consecutive, meaning it has to run, by statute, after. That's the 84 months. So you will serve the 180 months first. You have already started to serve that, in fact. Then you will serve the 84 months at the end.

That's a total of 264 months.

The reason it is a downward variance is because the guidelines would have you at 346 months. But I believe, as I have stated, that all of the qualities relating to the robberies, relating to the drugs, relating also to who you are merit that a downward variance is appropriate here. I don't think that more than 15 years is necessary for those crimes. And that's why I am varying downward. I don't think you need 30 years for those.

In terms of supervised release, there will be supervised release imposed. In fact, some of it is required. Under Count One, there has to be at least five years — actually it is not. It is because it is a (b) now, so it is four years. So it is a four-year requirement for Count One.

I will impose, then, the four years of supervised release for Count One.

It is a maximum of three years for Count Two, and I impose max the three years for Two, which is going to run concurrent; and three years for Count Three, which I am also going to run concurrent.

So you will serve a total of four years of supervised release.

I don't believe there is any sentencing disparity between you and the other individuals who were sentenced in what we call the Camacho proceedings because the facts and circumstances of your offenses are different from theirs. There is some overlap, there is no doubt about it, but their situation and each of their individual circumstances as individual defendants were taken one by one, and I have evaluated you as against each of them to ensure that there is no undue sentencing disparity.

There are going to be certain conditions going along with supervised release, mandatory conditions:

One, you can't commit another federal, state, or local crime;

Two, you can't illegally possess a controlled substance.

Three, I am going to have you do one random drug test within 15 days of the commencement of your period of supervised release and two random drug tests thereafter. The reason for that is you have had some drug use in the past. Sometimes people who are dealing in heroin have been users of something in the past; and, frankly, sometimes there are drugs in jail, so people don't always get clean in jail, though we would like to think that they did. So it is useful to have that.

Four, you shall not possess a firearm, destructive device.

Five, you shall cooperate in the collection of DNA.

And there are going to be standard conditions 1 through 13.

I am also going to impose the following special conditions:

One, you shall provide the probation office with any requested financial information;

Two, you shall submit your person, vehicle, and place of residence to searches as reasonably requested by probation;

Three, you are to report to the nearest probation office within 72 hours of your release from custody, and you will be supervised in your district of residence.

There will be a special assessment, which I am required to impose; \$300. It is \$100, mandatory by statute, for each of the offenses of conviction, that is due and payable as soon as practicable.

I am not going to impose a fine because any financial resource which you or your family may have which would be accessible to you are needed by your family in your absence, so I decline to impose a fine.

I don't know if there are any property or proceeds that are subject to forfeiture. Under the statute forfeiture would be required of any property or proceeds traceable to the

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Mr. Mukhi, the government should submit an order to 1 2 the court if the government is seeking forfeiture here. 3 MR. MUKHI: Your Honor, we are not going to seek 4 forfeiture. 5 THE COURT: There is no order of forfeiture imposed, and there is no order of restitution. 6 7 Do counsel have any legal or other reason why sentence should not be imposed as stated? 8 9 MR. MUKHI: No, your Honor. 10 Just so I am clear, your Honor imposed on Count One 11 and Count Two 180 months, each to run concurrently; and on 12 Count Three 84 months to run consecutively to both Counts One 13 and Two. 14 THE COURT: Correct. And it must be, by statute, 15

consecutive to One and Two, so that will be consecutive to the 180 months, for a total of 264.

MR. MUKHI: Thank you.

MR. DeCASTRO: No, Judge.

THE COURT: Then the court does impose sentence as stated.

There are any open counts, Mr. Mukhi?

MR. MUKHI: Your Honor, there is an open indictment and the government moves to dismiss it at this time.

THE COURT: All right. Then that is dismissed.

Mr. Serrano, you have a right to appeal. Any notice

of appeal has to be filed within 14 days of the filing of the judgment of conviction. Your counsel should follow when that will happen, but it's going to happen probably Monday. That's when it is likely to be filed. It is not going to be this afternoon. So your time will start to run.

Now, if you can't afford the cost of appeal, you are entitled to petition to proceed to have those costs waived.

That's proceeding in forma pauperis, and you are entitled to make such a petition.

Are there any other applications which the court should be made aware of at this time?

MR. MUKHI: Not from the government, your Honor.

MR. DeCASTRO: Judge, the only application we have is that you make a recommendation to the Bureau of Prisons that he been housed at a facility as close as possible to Jersey City, where his wife and child reside.

THE COURT: Would Fort Dix be the closest? I don't know if he will meet the security level.

MR. DeCASTRO: I don't know what the security level issue is. I have a call in to BOP. They just haven't gotten back to me yet. If they tell me that there is a particular facility that I should request, I would write a letter next week. But if your Honor would just recommend that it be as close to Jersey city as possible --

THE COURT: What we will do, and I will put a finer

point on it because of the age of his son, what I will do is say the court does recommend that he been housed in a facility as close to Jersey city as possible to allow for as frequent visitation as is practicable for his very young son. The court finds that continued visitation between the parent and son is very important here, so I will make that recommendation.

MR. DeCASTRO: Thank you, Judge.

THE COURT: Is there anything further?

MR. MUKHI: No, your Honor. Thank you.

THE COURT: Then we are adjourned.

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